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NOTE
Echoes from the Past: How the Federal
Circuit Continues to Struggle with
Patentable Subject Matter Post-Bilski
Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d 1057 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
JEFF THRUSTON*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2010, the United States Supreme Court levied a decision in Bilski v.
Kappos that cast further doubt over what exactly constitutes patentable sub-
ject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101 by striking down the Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit's machine-or-transformation test.' As the sole test of
what constituted patent-eligible subject matter, the machine-or-transformation
test determined patent eligibility based on the claimed subject matter either
being implemented by a particular machine specifically tailored for such a
purpose or on the claimed matter's ability to transform an article from one
form to another.2 Bilski replaced this test with a case-by-case factual inquiry
under the patent policy rationale that applying a hard and fast rule, the ma-
chine-or-transformation test, was arbitrarily restricting patentable subject
matter.3 Now, courts have been tasked with applying the individual facts of
each case challenging 35 U.S.C. § 101 to the patent eligibility trio: Benson,
Flook,5 and Diehr.6 However, the machine-or-transformation test is still a
factor to be considered by the courts.7 Meaning, if an invention satisfies the
machine-or-transformation test, it qualifies as patentable subject matter.
* B.S., University of Missouri 2008; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri
School of Law 2012; Associate Member, Missouri Law Review, 2011-12. I would
like to thank Professor Dennis Crouch for inspiring this Note. I would also like to
thank Clayton Thompson, Kyle Gottuso, and Joseph Blumberg, without whose help
this Note would never have come to fruition.
1. 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3227 (2010).
2. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 960 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), aff'd sub nom.
Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
3. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3229-30.
4. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
5. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
6. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
7. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3231.
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However, failing the test is not per se dispositive of failing to meet the re-
quirements of 35 U.S.C. § 101.
The recent case of Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC pre-
sented the Federal Circuit with one of its first opportunities to apply the new
post-Bilski patent eligibility standard. Unfortunately, the post-Bilski standard
appeared difficult to apply - potentially because the cases making up the pa-
tent eligibility trio are inherently inconsistent with one another. Regardless,
Classen Immunotherapies does not bode well for the future of 35 U.S.C. §
101 cases, as it showcased the continued difficulties the Federal Circuit is
having with patent-eligible subject matter and, surprisingly, showed the frus-
trations that Chief Judge Randall Rader feels toward 35 U.S.C. § 101 chal-
lenges in general.9 Writing separately, Chief Judge Rader made a point of
stressing the pitfalls of the Federal Circuit entertaining subject matter eligibil-
ity challenges and forewarned of the implications this and all 35 U.S.C. § 101
challenges have on the future of claim drafting.'o
This Note will examine whether the cases comprising the eligible sub-
ject matter trio are inherently inconsistent. In looking at this issue, this Note
will ask if Classen Immunotherapies can be reconciled with the patent eligi-
bility trio, or if both the case and Judge Rader's concerns could have been
dealt with more effectively by applying 35 U.S.C. § 101 as a last resort, and
instead determining patent eligibility via 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103, and 112. It
is fundamentally more difficult, expensive, and time consuming to ascertain
which category of patentable subject matter a claimed invention falls into, or
if the claimed matter satisfies the patent eligibility trio, than it is to determine
whether the requirements of novelty, obviousness, and enablement have been
satisfied. This is especially so given the creative means with which practi-
tioners will draft claims to "satisfy" the requirements.
II. FACTS & HOLDING
Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC involved three patents
covering inventions created by Dr. John Barthelow Classen and assigned to
his company, Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. (Plaintiff). Specifically, the
patents included United States Patent Nos. 6,638,739 ('739), 6,420,139
('139), and 5,723,283 ('283).12 Dr. Classen determined that the schedule
used to immunize infants against infectious diseases could affect the later
onset of chronic immune-mediated disorders such as cancer and diabetes.' 3
8. 659 F.3d 1057 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
9. Id. at 1073-75 (Rader, C.J., offering additional views).
10. Id.
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The three patents state that . .. when one or more immunogens . . .
is first administered at an early age (typically prior to 42 days of
age), it can substantially decrease the incidence, frequency, preva-
lence or severity of, or prevent, at least one chronic immune medi-
ated disorder, and/or a surrogate marker thereof.14
As a result, the scope of Dr. Classen's three assigned patents claimed that
possible immunization schedules were to be screened and compared, the low-
est risk schedule identified, and the vaccine administered on the schedule that
offered the lowest occurrence of chronic disease.' 5
Plaintiff alleged that its patents, specifically '139 and '739, were in-
fringed when a healthcare provider reviewed the "relevant literature" and
selected a particular immunization schedule that was of lower risk regarding
the onset of immune mediated disorders and followed said schedule when
performing immunizations.16 Plaintiff also claimed that even if no change to
the schedule was made, both '139 and '739 were infringed when the relevant
literature was reviewed.' 7 Finally, Plaintiff claimed that the '283 patent was
infringed when the relevant literature was reviewed, regardless of whether the
one reviewing the literature is "a producer of vaccines, a health care provider,
or a concerned parent," and in spite of the fact that no immunizations were
performed in accordance with the relevant literature.' 8
The alleged infringers, Biogen IDEC, GlaxoSmithkline, Merck & Co.,
Inc., et al. (Defendants), moved for summary judgment at the district court
level, claiming, among other defenses, that Plaintiffs patents failed to meet
the requirements of statutory patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. §
101. 19 Because Plaintiffs patents claimed a correlation between vaccination
schedules and the incidence of immune mediated disorders, the patents
claimed a natural phenomenon; Defendants asserted that Plaintiffs patents
merely covered an abstract idea.20 The court determined that Plaintiffs three
patents were claiming merely abstract ideas, as "'thinking about"' the risk of
21
potential vaccinations was a mental process and thus not patentable. Plain-
tiff appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, and
the Federal Circuit affirmed, applying the holding of In re Bilski that without
a machine or transformation of matter, the patents covered ineligible subject
matter.22
14. Id.
15. Id. at 1060-61.
16. Id. at 1061-62.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 1061.
19. Id. at 1062.
20. See id at 1063.
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Plaintiff applied for a writ of certiorari, which was granted by the United
States Supreme Court.23 However, after the outcome in Bilski v. Kappos, in
2010 the Supreme Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit, as the decision in Bilski v. Kappos eliminated the strict ma-
chine-or-transformation test as the exclusive test for patentability.24 On re-
mand, Defendants argued that Plaintiff s patents encompassed merely reading
already published materials, that the comparing of immunization schedules
and selecting the lowest risk schedule was something performed exclusively
in the mind, and, citing Parker v. Flook, that the immunization itself, no mat-
ter how conventional, cannot turn an unpatentable principle into a patentable
process.25 Plaintiff rebutted Defendants' contentions and argued that Dr.
Classen had discovered a new method of immunizing infants that lowered the
risk of future immune mediated disease and that even though particular
claims, perhaps, were overbroad, others were directed specifically toward
"specific immunogens, specific immunization schedules, and specific im-
mune-mediated disorders."26 Thus, Plaintiff argued, the methods were not
'abstract."' 27
The Federal Circuit, on remand, referenced several cases in making its
final determination. Citing to Bilski v. Kappos, the Federal Circuit relied on
the reiteration of the Supreme Court that barring patent eligibility under 35
U.S.C. § 101 should be done sparingly, as § 101 is only a threshold test.28
However, the Federal Circuit was careful to note Justice Stevens' concur-
rence in Bilski that "'[t]he Court, in sum, never provides a satisfying account
of what constitutes an unpatentable abstract idea."'29 Also, relying upon In re
Prater, the court recognized that the mere inclusion of a mental process with-
in a patent was not, itself, fatal.30 But, the Court in Bilski reaffirmed "the
prohibition against patenting abstract ideas," and that merely "attempting to
limit the use of a formula to a particular technological" field or "adding in-
significant post-solution activity" cannot circumvent the bar of patenting ab-
stract ideas.3 1
Citing to Association for Molecular Pathology v. United States Patent
and Trademark Office, the Federal Circuit distinguished '283 from '139 and
'739, in that the '283 patent failed to contain a claimed immunization step. 32
23. Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 130 S. Ct. 3541 (2010).
24. Classen Immunotherapies, Inc., 659 F.3d at 1063.
25. Id. (citing Parker v. Flook, 467 U.S. 584, 590 (1978)).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 1064.
29. Id. at 1065 (alteration in original) (quoting Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218,
3236 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 1067 (internal quotation marks omitted).
32. Id. (citing Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office, 653 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2011)).
594 [Vol. 77
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"[M]ethods that simply collect and compare data, without applying the data in
a step of the overall method, may fail to traverse the §101 filter."33 Although
admitting the lack of a tangible definition of an "abstract idea," the Federal
Circuit held that '283 merely invited a reader to think that the immunization
step of '139 and '739 necessarily pulled the claims of those patents "through
the coarse filter" of 35 U.S.C. § 101.34 Thus, post-Bilski, the rigid machine-
or-transformation test has been replaced by a necessary case-by-case inquiry
into whether a patent contains 35 U.S.C. § 101 patentable subject matter. The
Federal Circuit, relying on Bilski, agreed that a blanket ban of certain, non-
codified subject matter was a great disservice to the patent world.35
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The United States Constitution provides Congress with the power to es-
tablish and regulate a national patent system through the patent clause, which
states that Congress shall have the power "[t]o promote the Progress of Sci-
ence and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." 36 Passed
pursuant to the Patent Act of 1952, 35 U.S.C. § 101 states "[w]hoever invents
or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composi-
tion of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a pa-
tent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title."3 Con-
gress intended these terms to be expansive in order to ensure ingenuity had
"liberal encouragement." 38 Not included within the statutory construction are
three judicially created exclusions to patentable subject matter: "laws of na-
ture, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas." 39 The exclusion of this matter
exists because it has always been the parlance of all men and cannot be ex-
cluded from them.40 However, with such broad statutory wording, the courts
had to quickly get to work fleshing out what exactly qualified or did not qual-
ify as patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. As this Note will
show, the approaches of the various courts are quite divergent.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1067-68.
35. See id.
36. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
37. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
38. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308-09 (1980) (quoting Thomas
Jefferson) (internal quotation marks omitted). The language of 35 U.S.C. §101 has
roots dating back to the original Patent Act of 1793. See id.
39. Id. at 309.
40. See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589 (1978); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409
U.S. 63, 67 (1972); Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130
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A. No Patents for Abstract Ideas?
One of the first cases to address the issue of whether abstract ideas fell
within the patent purview was in 1852 in Le Roy v. Tatham.41 The Tathams
(Defendants on appeal) were the assignees of a patent for "improvements
upon, and additions to, the machinery used for manufacturing pipes and tubes
from lead or tin, or an alloy of soft metals capable of being forced, by great
pressure, from out of a receiver, through or between apertures, dies, and
cores, when in a set or solid state."42 Defendants brought a patent infringe-
ment case in the Southern District of New York, basing their claim upon Le
43Roy (Plaintiff on appeal) manufacturing two thousand tons of lead pipe.
The Southern District found for the Tathams, stating that Le Roy manufac-
tured 711,551 pounds of infringing pipe and that the Tathams were entitled to
money damages.44
On appeal, Plaintiffs argued the jury instruction, "that the originality of
the invention did not consist in the novelty of the machinery, but in bringing a
newly discovered principle into practical application" was clearly errone-
ous.45 The Supreme Court agreed, stating: "We think there was error in the
above instruction, that the novelty of the combination of the machinery, spe-
cifically claimed by the patentees as their invention, was not a material fact
for the jury, and that on that ground, the judgment must be reversed."46 I
defining "principle" the Supreme Court noted
[t]he word principle is used . . . in adjudications of courts, with
such a want of precision in its application, as to mislead. It is ad-
mitted, that a principle is not patentable. A principle, in the ab-
stract, is a fundamental truth; an original cause; a motive; these
cannot be patented, as no one can claim in either of them an exclu-
sive right.47
The Court held that the invention, in itself, was not in discovering the
abstract principle, which is open to all, but in applying the principle to a use-
ful object.48
41. 55 U.S. 156.
42. Id. at 172.
43. Id. at 171-72.
44. Tatham v. Le Roy, 23 F. Cas. 709, 716 (S.D.N.Y. 1852), rev'd, 55 U.S. 156.
45. Tatham, 55 U.S. at 176-77.
46. Id at 177.
47. Id. at 174-75.
48. Id. at 175.
596 [Vol. 77
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B. Chakrabarty & State Street: The Pre-Bilski
Standard Applied by the Federal Circuit
In Diamond v. Chakrabarty, the Supreme Court confronted the issue of
whether a man-made, genetically engineered bacterium (Pseudomonas) capa-
ble of breaking down crude oil was patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101. 49 The patent examiner rejected Chakrabarty's claims relating to the
bacterium itself on the grounds that micro organisms are a product of nature
and that living things are not patentable subject matter.50 Chakrabarty ap-
pealed to the Patent Office Board of Appeals which affirmed the patent exam-
iner on the ground that 35 U.S.C. § 101 was not meant to cover living
things.51 The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals reversed, citing the hold-
ing in In re Bergy, which stated, "'the fact that microorganisms . . .are alive .
[is] without legal significance' for purposes of the patent law." 52
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether
Chakrabarty's bacterium constituted a "'manufacture"' or "'composition of
matter' within 35 U.S.C. § 101. 5 Looking at the plain meaning of the stat-
ute and a lack of contrary legislative history, the Court determined that "[i]n
choosing such expansive terms as 'manufacture' and 'composition of matter,'
modified by the comprehensive 'any,' Congress plainly contemplated that the
patent laws would be given wide scope." 54 Ultimately, the Court held that
"Congress intended statutory subject matter to 'include anything under the
sun that is made by man,"' 55and since Chakrabarty's bacterium was not natu-
rally occurring, but was instead altered by man, it fell plainly within patenta-
ble subject matter.56
Eighteen years later, in 1998, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Cir-
cuit further refined the standard to be applied when evaluating 35 U.S.C. §
101 patentable subject matter in State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature
Financial Group, Inc.57 In State Street, the Federal Circuit was tasked with
determining whether a claimed invention, which allowed its operator "to
monitor and record the financial information flow and make all calculations
necessary for maintaining a partner fund financial services configuration,"
satisfied 35 U.S.C. § 101 patentable subject matter.5 The Federal Circuit
49. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 305-06 (1980).
50. Id at 306.
51. Id.
52. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting In re Bergy, 563 F.2d 1031, 1038 (1977)).
53. Id. at 307.
54. Id. at 308.
55. Id. at 309 (citing S. REP. No. 82-1979, at 5 (1952); H.R. REP. No. 82-1923, at
6 (1952)).
56. See id
57. 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998), abrogated by In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), aff'dsub nom. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
58. Id. at 1371.
2012] 597
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determined that Signature Financial Group's patent, as claimed, consisted of
"a machine, namely, a data processing system for managing a financial ser-
vices configuration of a portfolio established as a partnership."
The Federal Circuit again noted that the plain and unambiguous lan-
guage of 35 U.S.C. § 101 provides that any "process, machine, manufacture,
or composition of matter . .. may obtain a patent."60 Since the patent in ques-
tion claimed a machine, or at the very least a process implemented by a ma-
chine, the court determined it was patentable subject matter.61 However, the
analysis did not stop there because, although the patent fell within 35 U.S.C.
§ 101, it could still fail under the judicial exceptions to patentable subject
matter: laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas.62 The ques-
tion then became whether the claimed invention, specifically its mathematical
algorithm component, was unpatentable due to being an abstract idea.6 3
Mathematical algorithms are not patentable when "they are merely abstract
ideas constituting disembodied concepts or truths that are not 'useful."' 64
However, "the transformation of data, representing discrete dollar amounts,
by a machine through a series of mathematical calculations into a final share
price, constitutes a practical application of a mathematical algorithm, formu-
la, or calculation, because it produces 'a useful, concrete and tangible re-
sult."' 65 The pre-Bilski standard applied by the Federal Circuit was quite
expansive in its statutory interpretation, allowing for anything under the sun
made by man to fall within patentable subject matter, provided that the
claimed matter created some tangible result.
C. The Machine or Transformation Test: In re Bilski
In re Bilski was an appeal from the Board of Patent Appeals and Inter-
ferences' rejection of all eleven claims of Bernard Bilski and Rand Warsaw's
(Bilski) patent application. 6 Bilski appealed the Board's decision that the
patent application failed to fall within 35 U.S.C. § 101 patentable subject
67
matter. The Board summarized the claims of the invention as embodying "a
method of hedging risk in the field of commodities trading."68 Ultimately,
the Board held that because Bilski's claimed invention "did not produce a
'useful, concrete and tangible result,"' the process necessarily was an abstract
59. Id. at 1372.
60. Id.
6 1. Id.




66. 545 F.3d 943, 949 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), aff'd sub nom. Bilski v. Kap-
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idea that would remove risk hedging from being performed by any person or
machine in any field.69
The Federal Circuit reviewed the issue of whether Bilski's claimed in-
vention encompassed a fundamental process (abstract idea) or a mental pro-
cess. 70 In looking to the Supreme Court's decision in Diamond v. Diehr, the
Federal Circuit noted that "while a claim drawn to a fundamental principle is
unpatentable, 'an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a
known structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection.'" 7
But in order to determine whether Bilski's claimed process was narrowly
tailored enough to encompass only one application, the Federal Circuit
looked to the Supreme Court's definitive test: (1) is the claimed subject mat-
ter "tied to a particular machine or apparatus," or (2) does it "transform[] a
particular article into a different state or thing?" 72
The Federal Circuit viewed the machine-or-transformation test as a clue
to determining whether a claimed invention was narrowly tailored enough
such that, as claimed, it would not preempt substantially all uses of a funda-
mental principle, rendering it unpatentable.73 In essence, the use of a ma-
chine-or-transformation must limit the claim's scope in a meaningful way and
not merely act as post-solution activity in order to qualify as patentable sub-
ject matter.74 Also, the transformation of an article "must be central to the
purpose of the claimed process" in order to qualify for patent eligibility.
However, although In re Bilski was paramount in reiterating the machine-or-
transformation test, as distilled from prior Supreme Court jurisprudence, it
was equally important with regard to the patent eligibility tests it rejected.76
First, the Federal Circuit rejected the Freeman-Walter-Abele test.77 Se-
cond, the Federal Circuit struck down portions of the State Street decision;78
69. See id. at 950.
70. Id. at 952.
71. Id. at 953 (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187 (1981)). The Court
in Diehr thus drew a distinction between those claims that "seek to pre-empt the use
of' a fundamental principle, on the one hand, and claims that seek only to foreclose
others from using a particular "application" of that fundamental principle, on the
other. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187.
72. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 954 (citing Diehr, 450 U.S. at 182; Parker v. Flook,
437 U.S. 584, 588 n.9 (1978); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 70 (1972);
Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 788 (1876)).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 961-62.
75. Id. at 962.
76. Id. at 958-59.
77. Id. ("[The test] appears to conflict with the Supreme Court's proscription
against dissecting a claim and evaluating patent-eligibility on the basis of individual
limitations."). The Freeman-Walter-Abele test allowed process and method claims
for inventions that were implemented by software, provided that the claims did not
premempt unpatentable subject matter such as laws of nature or pure mathematical
algorithms. See In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902, 907-08 (C.C.P.A. 1982), abrogated by In
5992012]
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specifically, it rejected the useful, concrete, and tangible result test.79 Further,
the Federal Circuit stated that any of its prior decisions that relied upon either
the Freeman-Walter-Abele test80 or the useful, concrete, and tangible result
test should no longer be followed.8' Next, the Federal Circuit struck down
the technological arts test 82 and physical steps test.83  Finally, the Federal
Circuit upheld part of its decision in State Street - the rejection of a blanket
84
exclusion for business method patents. Although this was a major shift in
patent eligibility, the machine-or-transformation test would not last long.
D. The Patent Eligibility Trio: Benson, Flook, and Diehr
The most recent shift in patent-eligible subject matter came in the case
of Bilski v. Kappos. The Court in Bilski faced three questions on appeal
from the Federal Circuit's case of In re Bilski: may an invention meet the
criteria of 35 U.S.C. § 101 if "(1) it is not tied to a machine and does not
transform an article; (2) it involves a method of conducting business; and (3)
it is merely an abstract idea?"86 The Federal Circuit rejected its prior test for
determining whether a claimed invention was a patentable process under 35
U.S.C. § 101 - whether it produces a "'useful, concrete and tangible re-
re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2010); In re Walter, 618 F.2d 758, 765-67
(C.C.P.A. 1980), abrogated by In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943; In re Freeman, 573 F.2d
1237, 1245-47 (C.C.P.A. 1978), abrogated by In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 94..
78. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 959-60.
79. Id. ("[W]hile looking for 'a useful, concrete and tangible result' may in many
instances provide useful indications of whether a claim is drawn to a fundamental
principle or a practical application of such a principle, that inquiry is insufficient to
determine whether a claim is patent-eligible under [35 U.S.C. § 101]. And it was
certainly never intended to supplant the Supreme Court's test.").
80. Id. at 959 n. 17.
81. Id. at 960 n.19.
82. Id. (The technological arts test was noted as having never been adopted by
the Supreme Court, Federal Circuit, or any other court); see Ex parte Lundgren, No.
2003-2088, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d 1385, 1387-88 (B.P.A.I. Sept. 28, 2005) (noting that the
technological arts test should not act as a bar to patentability under 35 U.S.C. § 101).
83. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 960-61 ("[A] claim that recites 'physical steps' but
neither recites a particular machine or apparatus, nor transforms any article into a
different state or thing, is not drawn to patent-eligible subject matter. Conversely, a
claim that purportedly lacks any 'physical steps' but is still tied to a machine or
achieves an eligible transformation passes muster under [35 U.S.C. § 101].").
84. Id. at 960 (The Federal Circuit noted that all process claims (including busi-
ness method claims) are to be evaluated as any other process or method claim would
be.).
85. 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
86. Id. at 3223.
600 [Vol. 77
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sult.' 87 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address those questions and
to evaluate the new test handed down by the Federal Circuit.
At issue in Bilski was a method patent for hedging risk in the commodi-
ties trading industry.89 However, petitioner's main claims, claims 1 and 4,
merely defined the theory of hedging loss and implemented the theory into an
algorithm.90 Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, noted that the peti-
tioner was attempting "to patent both the concept of hedging risk and the
application" of hedging risk to the energy market.9 1 Justice Kennedy stressed
the importance of not "adopting categorical rules that might have wide-
ranging and unforeseen impacts." 92 As such, the Court struck down the ma-
chine-or-transformation test as the sole test for patent-eligible subject matter93
and instituted a case-by-case analysis in light of the Court's previous deci-
sions: Benson,94 Flook,95 and Diehr.96
The Court in Gottschalk v. Benson was faced with determining whether
an algorithm, the purpose of which was to convert binary-coded decimal nu-
merals into pure binary code, was patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. §
101.97 Claim 8 of the patent in question required, as the Court noted, an op-
erative device (reentrant shift register) to perform the algorithm, but said al-
gorithm was found to be able to be performed on existing digital computers
or even by humans without a computer.98 The Court found that although
claim 8 required a reentrant shift register, it was not limited solely to that
piece of hardware and as a result was not patentable subject matter.99 From a
public policy standpoint, that would have allowed for the patenting of a
mathematical algorithm, which is an abstract idea barred by 35 U.S.C. §
101. 1o
The Supreme Court in Parker v. Flook was faced with a claimed math-
ematical equation that was alleged to be an improvement in calculating alarm
limit values.' In much the same vein as the Court in Benson, the Court in
Flook noted that the claimed mathematical equation could be performed
87. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 959-60 & n.19.
88. See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3224-25.
89. Id. at 3223.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 3229.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 3226 ("The Court of Appeals incorrectly concluded that this Court has
endorsed the machine-or-transformation test as the exclusive test.").
94. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
95. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
96. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
97. Benson, 409 U.S. at 64.
98. See id. at 67, app. at 73.
99. Id. at 71-72, app. at 73.
100. Id. at 71-72.
101. 437 U.S. 584, 586 (1978).
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without an apparatus in the human mind. 102 Further, the patent specification
at issue failed to disclose any apparatus or means for adjusting an alarm sys-
tem. 0 3 The Court in Flook stated that "'[w]hile a scientific truth, or the
mathematical expression of it, is not [a] patentable invention, a novel and
useful structure created with the aid of knowledge of scientific truth may
be[.]"' 04 However, the Court warned that insignificant post-solution activity
to an otherwise unpatentable process cannot transform the unpatentable pro-
cess into a patentable process.'os
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Diamond v. Diehr in order to
clarify its prior precedent regarding process patents under 35 U.S.C. § 101.1o6
The patent application at issue in Diehr contained - as did the aforementioned
patent applications - an algorithm which was to be performed via a comput-
er.107 However, the algorithm in Diehr was tied specifically to a method for
molding raw rubber into precision products via a molding press, which was
temperature-controlled by said algorithm.'os The Court ultimately upheld the
patent under two rationales: first, processes that involve transformation of an
article into a different state or thing are patentable under 35 U.S.C. § 101;109
second, because claims that are drawn to otherwise statutory subject matter
do not become non-statutory simply by using a mathematical formula or
computers to perform several of the steps.i"0 The Court emphasized the need
to consider the claimed invention as a whole: "an application of a law of na-
ture or mathematical formula to a known structure or process may well be
deserving of patent protection.""' Therefore, under Diehr, a claimed pro-
cess may fall within patentable subject matter provided that the claimed steps,
when performed on an object, elicit a change. But, under Benson, if a process
is not tied to a particular machine, then the claimed process will fail to fall
within patentable subject matter. And, if the claimed process contains a
mathematical algorithm, then the algorithm must be integrated to such a de-
gree that removing it would destroy the process's functionality.
102. Id.
103. Id
104. Id. at 591 (quoting Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 306
U.S. 86,94 (1939)).
105. Id. at 590.
106. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
107. Id. at 177.
108. Id. at 178-79.
109. Id. at 184.
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IV. INSTANT DECISION
In the instant case, the court found that the '283 patent failed to meet or
exceed the threshold of patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101, as it
failed to claim more than the mental processes of reading the relevant litera-
ture and ascertaining the lowest risk immunization schedule thereafter.l12
According to the court, patents '139 and '739 were upheld as containing pa-
tentable subject matter, even though they required the same mental process as
patent '283.1 13 The Federal Circuit held them patentable because, in light of
Bilski, both patents required the additional step of performing the immuniza-
*114tion.
The court noted that after Diamond v. Diehr, "' [i]t is now commonplace
that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known
structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection."'1 This
principle went on to influence the Supreme Court in Bilski v. Kappos, where
the Court reiterated that 35 U.S.C. § 101 was only a threshold test for patent-
eligibility.' 16 The Federal Circuit took that into account in In re Prater,
which noted the precedent that, under 35 U.S.C. § 101, there could be no
rigid rule of ineligibility for a mental step, but that such steps had to be evalu-
ated on a spectrum from purely mental to purely physical and evaluated case-
by-case. 117
The majority in the instant case also noted that Justice Stevens in con-
currence found that the Supreme Court in Bilski "'never provides a satisfying
account of what constitutes an unpatentable abstract idea."" 18 The difficulty
of defining what exactly constituted an abstract idea was wrestled with previ-
ously in Research Corp. Technologies, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., where the
Federal Circuit stated "this court also will not presume to define 'abstract'
beyond the recognition that this disqualifying characteristic should exhibit
itself so manifestly as to override the broad statutory categories of eligible
subject matter."1 19 The Federal Circuit went on to explain in Research Corp.
that the claims in a patent must be considered in their totality when determin-
ing patent eligibility, and again the court reiterated that 35 U.S.C. § 101 is a
threshold test and not the ultimate test of patentability.1 20
112. See Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d 1057, 1067
(Fed. Cir. 2011).
113. Id. at 1067-68.
114. Id. at 1068.
115. Id at 1064 (quoting Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187).
116. See 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010).
117. Classen Immunotherapies, Inc., 659 F.3d at 1065 (citing In re Prater, 415
F.2d 1393, 1402 n.22 (C.C.P.A. 1969)).
118. Id. (quoting Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3236 (Stevens, J., concurring)).
119. Id. (quoting Research Corp. Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859,
868 (Fed. Cir. 2010)).
120. Id. at 1065-66.
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The majority, in the instant case, thus found that the claims of patent
'139 and '739 included a physical step of performing an immunization on a
determined schedule and as such were directed to a specific, tangible applica-
tion in accordance with its prior decision in Research Corp. and the guidance
set forth in Bilski v. Kappos that "'[r]ather than adopting categorical rules that
might have wide-ranging and unforeseen impacts,"' exclusions from patent-
eligibility should be applied narrowly. 12 1 The court ultimately held that the
subject matter of patents '139 and '739 traversed the coarse eligibility filter of
35 U.S.C. § 101.122 The court also distinguished patent '283 from '139 and
'739 by analogizing it to Association for Molecular Pathology v. United
States Patent and Trademark Office, which determined that methods that
merely collect data and compare data, without applying the data in a step of
the method itself, may fail to meet 35 U.S.C. § 101.123 This court, when tak-
ing Association for Molecular Pathology into account, determined that with-
out a specific application, patent '283 claimed only a purely mental process
and was thus an unpatentable abstract idea.124
V. COMMENT
Both the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court have struggled with 35
U.S.C. § 101. Both courts have gone back and forth establishing and overrul-
ing tests to determine patent-eligible subject matter. Not surprisingly, the
jurisprudence surrounding patent-eligible subject matter is scattered and con-
tradictory, and as a result, it is quite possible that the patent eligibility trio is
inherently contradictory. This Note will next address the inherent contradic-
tion of the patent eligibility trio in isolation and as applied to Classen Immu-
notherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, discuss the pitfalls of the current system,
and then offer a potentially better way of evaluating patent eligibility with
other statutes already in place.
A. The Inherent Conflict of the Patent Eligibility Trio
It is difficult to understand why the Supreme Court would choose to re-
vert back to thirty-plus-year-old case law in order to evaluate patentable sub-
ject matter in light of the fact that the chosen case law dealt with incredibly
outdated technology. Further, in order to qualify as eligible subject matter,
one's claimed invention must be reconciled with the inherently inconsistent
trio of Benson, Flook, and Diehr. Commentators have argued that the lack of
rationality and predictability in what constitutes patent-eligible subject matter
121. Id. at 1066 (alteration in original) (quoting Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3229).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1067 (citing Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trade-
mark Office, 653 F.3d 1329, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2011)).
124. See id. at 1067-68.
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stems from the ambiguous holding in Benson.125 Flook and Diehr were the
two most influential cases that followed the confusion handed down by Ben-
126
son.
Parker v. Flook incorrectly framed the issue of patentable subject matter
because of the poor analysis in Benson.127 The claimed subject matter in
Flook involved an algorithm, but the Court confused the subject matter as a
method with post-solution applications.128 In light of Benson's confusing
holding, the Court reasoned that the claimed algorithm was prior art and not
patentable, as it was a well known mathematical principle.129 Because of
Benson, the Court in Flook focused almost exclusively on a single claim - the
claimed algorithm.130 Benson's broad equation of an algorithm to a mathe-
matical formula brought Flook's mathematical formula within the categorical
restriction of algorithms.131 Ironically, the claimed formula was merely one
step in an algorithm.132 Instead of choosing to part with Benson, the Court
followed it - even though what constituted an algorithm was less than
clear. 3 3
The next case to deal with Benson's confusion was Diamond v. Diehr.
Diehr also dealt with a claimed mathematical formula - a formula necessary
in evaluating temperatures for rubber curing. 134 The majority held that the
claimed subject matter was for a typical industrial process and thus clearly
fell within patentable subject matter.'35  However, Benson and Flook had
created so much confusion regarding what constituted a patentable process
that coming to a reasoned decision was not possible. The Court chose to
avoid Flook's "prior art" language and yet purported to confirm its holding.137
Justice Stevens, who authored the Flook opinion, even had a difficult time
reconciling the trio - rather than following Supreme Court jurisprudence
125. See, e.g., Donald S. Chisum, The Patentability ofAlgorithms, 47 U. PITr. L.
REV. 959, 992 (1986).
126. See id.
127. Id. at 993 ("The Court treated the claimed subject matter as though it were a
method, one step of which was an 'algorithm or mathematical formula' and other
steps of which were 'conventional post-solution applications' of the formula.").
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 994.
13 1. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 994-95 ("[T]he Court left matters in confusion - what is an 'algo-
rithm'? how do algorithms differ from other, patentable processes? It also added an
aberrational corollary - treatment of what an inventor had discovered as though it
were known prior art. That aberration was so basically antithetical to patent law prin-
ciples that it would have to be purged.").
134. Id. at 995.
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alone, he chose to follow lower court decisions regarding mental steps in his
Diehr dissent.'38
B. Pitfalls of the Current System for Determining Patent Eligibility
In its decision in Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, the
Federal Circuit was tasked with applying the test handed down in Bilski v.
Kappos to the under-theorized doctrine of excluding abstract ideas from the
scope of patentable subject matter. 139 Though the court's ultimate conclusion
in the instant case is not all that surprising, namely that a purely mental pro-
cess, without more, is an abstract idea,140 the case still has far-reaching impli-
cations. First, this case is one of the most recent in a line of 35 U.S.C. § 101
challenges passing through the Supreme Court, and it was specifically re-
manded to the Federal Circuit to be decided in light of Bilski v. Kappos.141
Second, and most notably, this is one of the rare cases in which Federal Cir-
cuit Chief Judge Randall Rader chose to write separately from the majority
about his frustrations with subject matter challenges and their ultimate impact
upon the patent system as a whole.142
Challenges to patentability under 35 U.S.C. § 101 have a long and sto-
ried past. As early as 1839, Justice Story referred to patents as securing the
free flow of secrets into the community but warned against granting a patent
for a principle in the abstract.143 Just as Justice Story wrestled with the notion
of granting an exclusive right in an abstract idea, courts in the more modem
era have wrestled with the advancements in biological sciences and 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 challenges. For example, in Diamond v. Diehr, the Supreme Court
stated that "[i]t is now commonplace that an application of a law of nature or
mathematical formula to a known structure or process may well be deserving
of patent protection."" Out of the same line of cases grew Bilski v. Kappos,
which ultimately held that the machine-or-transformation test should no long-
er be the sole 35 U.S.C. § 101 filter and replaced it with a case-by-case factu-
al analysis.145
The court in Classen Immunotherapies, relying on Bilski, was left with-
out any tangible definition of "abstract." Similarly, the court was left without
a black-and-white test to apply to 35 U.S.C. § 101 challenge cases. Thus, as
138. Id. at 999 (Stevens' dissent in Diamond v. Diehr was in stark contrast to the
majority opinions in Flook and Benson, as well as the majority in Diehr which relied
on authority established in prior Supreme Court opinions.).
139. See Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d 1057, 1059
(Fed. Cir. 2011).
140. See id. at 1067-68.
141. Id. at 1059.
142. See id. at 1073-75 (Rader, C.J., offering additional views).
143. See Blanchard v. Sprague, 3 F. Cas. 648, 650 (C.C.D. Mass. 1839).
144. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187 (1981).
145. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3231 (2010).
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Bilski predicted, the court was forced to go through the patent eligibility trio
to determine whether Plaintiff s patents claimed more than an abstract idea.146
First, from Bilski itself, the court was well aware that 35 U.S.C. § 101 was
merely a threshold question1 47 - namely because subsequent statutes (§§ 102,
103, and 112) deal with the substantive nature of the claimed invention and
are more than adequate to parse out inventions that fail to be unanticipated,
novel, and fully disclosed.148 In applying the trio of cases, the Classen Im-
munotherapies court found that patent '283 was invalid as claiming an ab-
stract idea.149
The court noted the reliance of the Supreme Court in Bilski upon Dia-
mond v. Diehr, in which it was stated that a mathematical formula or law of
nature could be patented if it is incorporated such as to apply its properties.15 0
The court in Classen Immunotherapies, also relying upon that language, justi-
fied allowing patents '139 and '739 because, although they claimed a natural
phenomena (infant inoculations resulting in adult onset immune mediated
health problems), they were applied to the physical act of performing an im-
munization. Thus, because '139 and '739 were tailored to a specific act of
immunization, they were determined to move past the 35 U.S.C. § 101 barri-
er.152 Similarly, because '283 completely omitted the immunization step and
only claimed to be performing research in the relevant literature and ascer-
taining the safest immunization schedule, it was determined to have failed to
meet the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 101.53
What is troubling, however, is the court's failure to follow Flook. The
Supreme Court in Flook made it clear that applying a scientific truth, or the
mathematical expression of it, is not a patentable invention unless the claimed
invention also contains a novel and useful structure.' 54 However, the Court in
Flook warned that insignificant post-solution activity to an otherwise un-
patentable process cannot transform the unpatentable process into a patenta-
ble one. 55 Merely reading relevant literature and ascertaining the safest im-
munization schedule cannot be resurrected into patentable subject matter by
attaching the insignificant post-solution activity of performing the immuniza-
tion. However, the court in Classen found that the physical act of performing
an immunization was sufficient to lift an abstract concept into the realm of
patentable subject matter.156
146. See Classen Immunotherapies, Inc., 659 F.3d 1057.
147. Id. at 1064.
148. Id. at 1064-65; id. at 1073-75 (Rader, C.J., offering additional views).
149. See id. at 1067-68 (majority opinion).
150. Id. at 1067.
151. Id. at 1067-68.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 590-91 (1978).
155. Id. at 590.
156. See Classen Immunotherapies, Inc., 659 F.3d at 1067-68.
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Benson, although mentioned, was not analyzed appropriately. Benson
stood for the idea that pure algorithms could not be patented, for to do so
would preempt the algorithm from all markets - thus allowing for the patent-
ing of an abstract idea.157 The policy behind granting a patent is rather sim-
ple. You give an inventor a monopoly over a method, process, or composi-
tion of matter in a very limited field, and in exchange society receives the
knowledge. Without the "invention" being tailored to a specific implementa-
tion, the idea behind the invention is being taken from all facets of society.
Although the court in Classen Immunotherapies struck down '283 as failing
to be more than a purely mental process, it failed to surmise that '139 and
'739 were both merely the mental processes for reading literature and think-
ing about the literature. Thus, in theory, reading relevant medical literature
and thinking about it are now preempted from society as a whole because the
addition of post-solution activity (the actual act of performing immuniza-
tions) is sufficient to allow an abstract idea to become patentable.
An obviously frustrated Chief Judge Rader surprisingly concurred with
the majority that '139 and '739 were both patentable in light of Bilski, Flook,
Diehr, and Benson.159 However, he was quick to condemn the court's desire
to entertain so many 35 U.S.C. § 101 challenges. 1o Rader fears, and rightful-
ly so, that by constantly rewriting the rule as to what qualifies as 35 U.S.C. §
101 patentable subject matter, more claim drafters will be drawn into custom-
izing claim construction to usurp the system.'6' In doing so, the already
clogged United States Patent and Trademark Officel62 will be forced to ascer-
tain whether the claims they are examining are being custom tailored to de-
feat the system rather than looking for actual invention, novelty, and anticipa-
tion.
By encouraging claim drafters to draft their claims in a more clever
fashion, Rader feels that the already very expensive patent process will be-
come even more expensive.163 The more expensive it becomes, the fewer
inventors there will be who can ultimately afford the process.16 By barring
157. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71-72 (1972).
158. See Classen Immunotherapies, Inc., 659 F.3d at 1067-68.
159. See id at 1058.
160. See id. at 1073-74 (Rader, C.J., offering additional views).
161. See id. at 1074-75.
162. More than "1.2 million non-provisional patent applications are pending ex-
amination at the USPTO. Of those, more than 700,000 have not received even a pre-
liminary examination. The backlog is the source of a tremendous amount of bad
publicity for the USPTO." Dennis Crouch & Jason Rantanen, Unreasonable Patent
Applicant Delay and the USPTO Backlog, PATENTLY-O (July 9, 2010, 3:11 PM),
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2010/07/unreasonable-patent-applicant-delay-and-
the-uspto-backlog.html.
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the majority of inventors, at least financially, from the process, the calculus
breaks down. Meaning that incentivizing ingenuity with the monopoly that a
patent creates will no longer have the effect it currently does because most
inventors will not be able to afford the process in the first place, and even if
they can, there is no guarantee that the application will be granted a patent -
especially given the nature of the patentable subject matter test, i.e., the case-
-165
by-case analysis.
As evident in Classen Immunotherapies, the court is still having extreme
difficulty in light of the new test. It shows that even the Federal Circuit, a
court specifically created to harmonize the regional circuits' patent cases,
is unable to apply the standard handed down from the Supreme Court with
any kind of convincing rationale. In fact, the court here left its overall analy-
sis vague and couched in weak, pseudo-application of the patent eligibility
trio.
C. An Alternative Solution
As the conflicting case law shows, 35 U.S.C. § 101 is controversial.
The interesting part of the dilemma surrounding 35 U.S.C. § 101 is that it
does not need to be applied prior to 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103, and 112, yet near-
ly every court chooses to apply the statutes in that order.'67 Why apply the
most difficult statute first?
Avoiding 35 U.S.C. § 101 whenever possible makes sense for several
reasons. First, 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103, and 112 all have extensive bodies of
case law - "[a]ny validity requirement that has generated an extensive body
of case law will in general be a firmer and less controversial basis for invali-
dating a patent than the philosophical post-Bilski inquiry under § 101."l 68
Also, applying 35 U.S.C. § 101 becomes more and more convoluted because
its text has remained largely unchanged for 200 years, and yet the Supreme
165. "Only 54 percent of patent applications receive approval, according to the
patent office." Julia Feldmeier, Any Bright Ideas?; How Local Inventors Try to Capi-
talize on that 'Aha!' Moment, WASH. POST, Mar. 4, 2007, at MO1; Gene Quinn, The
Cost of Obtaining a Patent in the US, IPWATCHDOG (Jan. 28, 2011, 1:14 PM),
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2011/01/28/the-cost-of-obtaining-patent/id= 4668/
(stating that the average cost of filing and ultimately obtaining a patent ranges from
$5000 to more than $15,000 based on complexity).
166. FED. TRADE COMM'N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 10 (2003) ("Congress created the Feder-
al Circuit to bring about uniformity of decisions in certain critical areas of the law ...
. To this end, the Federal Circuit was given exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from
all district courts in cases which arise under the patent laws.").
167. Dennis Crouch & Robert P. Merges, Operating Efficiently Post-Bilski by
Ordering Patent Doctrine Decision-Making, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1673, 1679-82
(2010).
168. Id. at 1682.
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Court continues to read in restrictions that are not within the wording of the
statute, but which are based on policy.' 69 Second, the patent validity statutes
contain a substantial amount of overlap, meaning that a claimed invention
could and often does fail under multiple statutory restrictions. 170
In a study of 1500 recently issued U.S. patents, 84% of the applications
that were rejected on patentable subject matter grounds were also rejected on
anticipation or obviousness grounds, under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103.
Similarly, in a recent study of 117 published opinions of the Board of Patent
Appeals and Interferences, 94% of the claims questioned on patentable sub-
ject matter grounds were also rejected on at least one other ground.172 "This
data appears to show an exceptionally high rate of doctrinal overlap and lends
credence to the idea that, by initially avoiding subject-matter-eligibility ques-
tions, many of those potential issues will be avoided." 7 3 Meaning, if you
were to apply 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103, and 112 prior to 101, 94% of patents
that would have failed under 101 would still fail, but the process would be
much easier. For example, Bilski v. Kappos - which as it stands has created a
great deal of controversy' 74 - could have been decided under other patent
validity doctrines, which would not have had such far reaching consequences.
The concept of hedging risk is quite old and more likely than not would have
been unpatentable on obviousness or anticipation grounds. Thus the Court
could have invalidated Bilski's patent without ever having to invoke the con-
troversial 35 U.S.C. § 101. By avoiding the most vague patent eligibility
doctrines, courts will save invaluable time and resources.
VI. CONCLUSION
The patent world is still adjusting to Bilski v. Kappos, in which the ma-
chine-or-transformation test was scrapped for a less tangible, and more diffi-
cult to apply, case-by-case factual analysis. Even though the Supreme Court
in Bilski claimed a public policy rationale for dropping the machine-or-
169. Id.
170. Id. at 1686.
171. Id. (citing Christopher A. Cotropia, Mark Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Do
Applicant Patent Citations Matter? Implications for the Presumption of Validity
(Stanford Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 401, 2010), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract- 1656568).
172. Id.
173. Id. at 1686-87.
174. See John F. Duffy, Why Business Method Patents, 63 STAN. L. REv. 1247,
1248 (2011) ("The Supreme Court's decision in Bilski seems unlikely to end all con-
troversy over business method patents. Rather, the debate over business method pa-
tents will now turn from the question whether any business methods are patentable to
the question how broad the scope of patentable subject matter should be for business
methods.").
175. See Crouch & Merges, supra note 167, at 1691.
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transformation test, it has made the already difficult task of determining
patent eligibility even less clear. The difficulty of the new test hardly makes
the public policy rationale worthwhile, as time will show with more and more
35 U.S.C. § 101 litigation.
Without the machine-or-transformation test acting as the sole filter for
35 U.S.C. § 101 patent eligibility, courts are now to apply a trio of patent
eligibility cases. Invariably, allowing a plethora of federal district courts to
apply a trio of cases will lead to splits in what constitutes patentable subject
matter. Thus, more 35 U.S.C. § 101 cases will be awaiting determination in
the Federal Circuit. The Supreme Court will then be called on, again, to hand
down yet another test with which the Federal Circuit and district courts will
be obligated to apply. Obviously fearing that, Judge Rader wrote about his
personal frustrations with entertaining 35 U.S.C. § 101 challenges.
By entertaining 35 U.S.C. § 101 challenges, Rader warned, those tasked
with drafting patent applications will seek unique ways to usurp the system in
order to obtain patents on subject matter outside the scope of 35 U.S.C. §
101.177 In doing so, more § 101 challenges will be filed - those challenges,
coupled with the inevitable challenges filed as a result of the Supreme Court's
case-by-case analysis creating divergences across the district courts, will re-
sult in an even more expensive, time consuming, and arduous patent system.
Until the Supreme Court hands down a rigid test of patentability that can be
applied even handedly across the courts, the patent system will continue to
fail, miserably.
However, until then, a more pragmatic approach to patent-eligible sub-
ject matter needs to be applied. By avoiding a rigid application of the patent
validity statutes, namely 35 U.S.C. § 101 prior to §§ 102, 103, and 112, all
courts can avoid the problem the Chief Judge Rader fears - clever claim
drafting to satisfy § 101.178 By placing § 101 at the end of the patent validity
inquiry, more than 84% of claimed subject matter would fail anyway. There-
fore, applying 35 U.S.C. § 101 first is not only a waste of time and money but
also breeds additional § 101 challenges and clever claim drafting - problems
that commentators and judges alike fear.
176. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3227 (2010).
177. See Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d 1057, 1074-75
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